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NATO AND EU  
APPROACH TOWARDS  
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS  
IN MILITARY OPERATIONS 
One might say that the relations between the civilians and the force 
conducting a military operations are as old as the history of war itself. 
For centuries, soldiers have been interacting with the civilian sphere on 
the frontlines. Yet, the nature of this relationship varied and evolved over 
the time and space together with the evolution of warfare. Probably the 
biggest change was the effect of the last 25 years. The military was never 
enthusiastic about their involvement with the police and civil administra-
tion but after the fall of the bipolar system the interaction between sol-
diers and civilians became inevitable and constant. This called for a new 
approach towards civil-military cooperation. 
The objective of this article is to analyse and compare the approach 
to the relation between the military and the civilian domains of two 
peace-oriented international organisations: NATO (North-Atlantic Trea-
ty Organisation) and EU (European Union). Both organisations have 
their own, specific policies concerning civil-military cooperation. Their 
respective definitions and principles vary sometimes to a vast degree.  
In order to achieve the objective of the article I will first present short 
historic overview of the evolution of the concepts of civil-military coopera-
tion of each organisation. After that, I will analyse those concepts using 
three categories: definition, place within the overall strategy and the approach 
towards the concept of comprehensive approach, and finally the institutional 
setting. The closing part of the article will be focused on identification of the 
most important drawbacks and challenges within each concept. 
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Evolution of the concept 
NATO 
The origins of NATO’s institutionalisation of the concept of civil-
military cooperation are strictly connected to the international setting of 
the 1990s when the Balkan wars led to the new perception of the opera-
tional environment. The role of the military during an operation in the 
“pre-Balkan” environment did not require much consideration of the 
civil-military interaction. The analysis of the civil dimension was mostly 
limited to military intelligence (CIMIC Peacekeeping Intensive Training, 
2010). Yet, due to the asymmetry of the conflict, the interaction between 
soldiers and the local population became inevitable. Military forces are 
now operating in a complicated environment where the distinction be-
tween battlefield and relatively peaceful area beyond is blurred. NATO 
operations are conducted in an environment where “the people in the 
streets, and houses and fields – all the people anywhere – are the battle-
field” (AJP 3.4.9..., 2013). 
Another factor that influenced the development of a concept of civil-
military cooperation within NATO was the rapidly growing number and 
importance of civilian actors working in the field. In 1999, along with 
the deployment of the mission of Kosovo Force (KFOR), approximately 
500 organisations started their work in the theatre of operation (Mockai-
tis, 2004: VI). The coordination of their activities was an enormous chal-
lenge for the military administration. After the signing of peace agree-
ments, some civilian international agencies took responsibility for key 
areas of post-conflict reconstruction like monitoring governmental struc-
tures and local police, delivery of humanitarian aid and help in organisa-
tion of elections (Mockaitis, 2004: 14).  
After the Balkan wars, NATO’s Command realised that the objec-
tive of armed forces is not only to lead to a ceasefire and maintain the 
peace. Their task should also comprise of assistance and facilitation in 
the delivery of humanitarian aid and in the reconstruction of infrastructure 
and civilian institutions (Mockaitis, 2004: 1). In all types of NATO opera-
tions, commanders are more and more obliged to take into account politi-
cal, social, economic, cultural, religious, environmental and humanitarian 
factors (AJP 3.4.9…2013: p. 2–1). Consequently, there was a need for 
a mechanism which would enable and facilitate a framework for coopera-
tion between the armed forces and civilian actors with different profiles 
and mandates. In order to achieve an enhanced coordination of actions 
within the area of operation, NATO’s Command initiated the process of 
institutionalisation of the approach towards civil-military cooperation. 
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Changes in the operational environment have led to the development 
of a new Strategic Concept in 1999. According to its provisions “(t)he 
interaction between Alliance forces and the civil environment (both gov-
ernmental and non-governmental) in which they operate is crucial to the 
success of operations. Civil-military cooperation is interdependent: mili-
tary means are increasingly requested to assist civil authorities; at the 
same time civil support to military operations is important for logistics, 
communications, medical support, and public affairs.” (Alliance’s Stra-
tegic Concept…, 1999: art.60). The Strategic Concept thus stressed the 
importance of civilian entities in the area of operation and declared the 
Alliance’s commitment to cooperation. 
NATO’s policy on civil-military cooperation was established by a Mili-
tary Committee document MC 411/1. This text is not a formally agreed 
NATO document and, therefore, does not necessarily represent the offi-
cial views of individual member governments on all policy issues dis-
cussed. In general, NATO Member States are allowed to interpret 
NATO’s policy on CIMIC in accordance with their national provisions.  
EU 
In order to present the evolution of European Union’s concept of 
civil-military cooperation it is necessary to go back to the creation of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It was introduced as one 
of the three pillars of the European Union as an effect of the Maastricht 
Treaty. CFSP was established as a step in “the eventual framing of a com-
mon defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence” 
(Treaty on European Union, 1992: art. J4). Yet, despite ambitious objec-
tives in the area of external security identified within the Treaty of Maas-
tricht, no concrete provisions were introduced. It changed, similarly as in 
the case of NATO, after the Balkan wars in the late 1990s. After the St. 
Malo Declaration (1998) calling for creating European capacity for mili-
tary action and after the following European Council summit meetings 
EU established Petersberg Tasks. They consisted of humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis man-
agement including peacemaking, meaning that they had both a military 
and a civilian dimension. In 1999 during the Cologne and Helsinki Meet-
ings, the European Council laid foundations for European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP, since 2009 CSDP). The next important step was 
the introduction of the first ever European Security Strategy (ESS, 
2003), which identified key threats and challenges facing Europe. This 
document underlines a unique status of the EU, as a security actor with  
a wide range of instruments, both civilian and military. 
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The year 2003 was important also for two reasons other than signing 
the European Security Strategy. The EU has launched its first ESDP 
missions (EU Police Missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Operation 
Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and signed an 
agreement on European Defence: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and 
Operations (so-called Berlin Plus arrangement). The latter is of a big rele-
vance for this analysis, as the agreement called for establishing within the 
EU Military Staff a cell with civil and military components which tasks 
would include among others: developing expertise in managing the civilian 
and/or military interface and conducting strategic advance planning for joint 
civil-military operations. Based on the Berlin Plus arrangement, the EU creat-
ed a Civilian Military Cell (CivMil Cell) within the EU Military Staff which 
was responsible for generating the capacity to plan and run operations. 
Together with the European Security Strategy, the Berlin Plus ar-
rangement created the basis for institutionalisation of EU’s concept of 
civil-military cooperation. Those documents were developed by so-called 
Headline Goals. The Military Headline Goal 2010 (set in 2004) confirmed 
that “the EU has the civilian and military framework needed to face the 
multifaceted nature of these new threats” (Headline Goal, 2010: art. A1). 
One of the core goals set for the EU Member States in the Military Head-
line Goal was interoperability, defined as “the ability of our armed forces 
to work together and to interact with other civilian tools.” (Headline Goal, 
2010: art. A3). Moreover, “EU will further strengthen the coordinated use 
of its civil and military capabilities acknowledging that modern Crisis 
Management Operations typically require a mixture of instruments” 
(Headline Goal, 2010: art. B9). 
The Military Headline Goal repeated the commitment of the Berlin 
Plus arrangement to create a Civilian Military Cell which would have 
a capacity to rapidly create an operation centre for particular operations. 
Definitions 
NATO 
According to MC 411/1 Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is “the 
co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the 
NATO Commander and civil actors, including national populations and 
local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental 
organisations and agencies” (MC 411/1, 2001: art.4). 
NATO CIMIC is conducted in support of the mission of the military 
commander. This does not imply that the military takes control over the 
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activities of civil actors. CIMIC tasks are performed in order to acceler-
ate achievement of the objectives of the mission and transition of the 
responsibility to the appropriate civil organisations and legitimised local 
authorities. Therefore all the activities conducted as a result of CIMIC 
have to be associated with an operational objective. 
The core functions of NATO CIMIC are defined in Allied Joint Publi-
cation 9 (AJP 9) as: Civil-Military Liaison, Support to the Force and Sup-
port to Civil Actors and Their Environment. Civil-military liaison means 
establishing and maintaining a relationship with civil actors at all possible 
levels, though mandates of some organisations (e.g. International Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement) might exclude any working relations with the 
force. Next, depending on the circumstances, NATO commander might 
need support from the civil environment. This might take shape of access to 
civilian resources or reduction of civilian disruption to the military opera-
tion. Last but not least, the military is obliged to support civil actors and 
their environment whenever it is required for the achievement of the objec-
tives of the military mission. There are various types of support to civil ac-
tors, including: information, personnel, materiel, equipment, communica-
tions facilities, expertise or training. Yet, the support by military means 
should be performed only as a last resort (AJP 9, 2003: pp. 2–3 – 2–5). 
EU 
With regards to the European Union there are two concepts applica-
ble to the relations between civilians and the military. First one – Civil-
Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is a military support function, similar to 
that of NATO. It is related to cooperation between different actors in the 
field at operational-tactical level. It is not of the primary concern as the EU 
has not so far deployed a truly mixed civil-military operation (Khol, 2007: p. 
121). The second concept is Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO) and refers 
to the intra-area relations at the political and strategic level. 
The definition of EU’s CIMIC was set in Civil-Military Cooperation 
(CIMIC) Concept for EU-led Crisis Management Operations (2002) and 
was based on the definition written by NATO. The purpose of EU CIMIC is 
to “establish and maintain on the one hand the co-operation between the 
military components and any external civilian actors including IO and/or 
NGO whose in theatre efforts are mutually supportive. On the other hand 
CIMIC will establish and maintain the co-operation with the civilian au-
thorities and populations within the Commander's area of operations, in 
order to create the best possible moral, material and tactical conditions for 
achievement of the mission's purpose. The focus of CIMIC is to support the 
military mission.” (CIMIC Concept for EU-led…, 2002: para. 15). 
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Core functions of the European CIMIC are similar to those defined 
by NATO and include Civil-Military Liaison, Support to the Civil Envi-
ronment and Support to the Military Force. 
CMCO was defined as an “effective co-ordination of the actions of all 
relevant EU actors involved in the planning and the subsequent implemen-
tation of EU’s response to the crisis” (Council Doc. 14457/03, 2003: para. 
1). ESDP/CSDP missions vary greatly with regards to their mandates, 
length and types of instruments. Therefore, detailed structures and proce-
dures are less practical while a greater coherence can be achieved thanks 
to a culture of coordination. CMCO should be established at the earliest 
possible stage of EU’s response to a crisis situation and then performed for 
the whole duration of the operation. CMCO was designed primarily to 
ensure internal EU coordination in crisis management but it was also a pre-
requisite for cooperation with external actors. 
Overall strategy and comprehensive approach 
NATO 
NATO’s new Strategic Concept “Active Engagement, Modern De-
fence” (2010) offers the Alliance’s partners more political engagement 
and an important role in shaping NATO-led military operations. The 
Alliance is prepared to develop dialogue and cooperation and to con-
sult any relevant organisations interested in securing peace and stabil-
ity, and to deepen its already existing partnerships. It recognises that 
modern security environment contains a vast and evolving set of chal-
lenges. As a response to those “NATO has a unique and robust set of 
political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of cri-
ses – before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ 
an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help man-
age developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance securi-
ty, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where 
they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-
conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security.” 
(Active Engagement; 2010: art. 4b) 
Moreover, as the Strategic Concept states, NATO’s experiences and 
lessons learned from past and ongoing operations show that to conduct 
an effective crisis management there is a need for a comprehensive polit-
ical, civilian and military approach. Therefore the Alliance will actively 
encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of military oper-
ations. This will allow to maximise coherence and effectiveness of the 
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mission. During the stabilisation period of an operation “NATO will be 
prepared and capable to contribute to stabilisation and reconstruction, in 
close cooperation and consultation wherever possible with other relevant 
international actors” (Active Engagement; 2010: art. 24). In order to 
increase the effectiveness of crisis management NATO will “enhance 
integrated civilian-military planning (…); develop the capability to 
train and develop local forces in crisis zones, so that local authorities 
are able, as quickly as possible, to maintain security without interna-
tional assistance; identify and train civilian specialists from member 
states, made available for rapid deployment by Allies for selected 
missions, able to work alongside our military personnel and civilian 
specialists from partner countries and institutions; broaden and inten-
sify the political consultations among Allies, and with partners (…).” 
(Active Engagement; 2010: art. 25). 
The operational environment of NATO military mission is complex 
and the challenges within are interlinked. Modern crisis management 
operations have expanded in terms of the tasks involved. The armed 
forces are only one part of the comprehensive approach and therefore are 
not able to address all the aspects alone. They are not equipped or ade-
quate for performing civil tasks. In order to achieve the satisfactory end 
state, they need the assistance of civilian agencies to fill the humanitari-
an gap (CIMIC Field Handbook, 2012: pp. I-2-1 –I-2-2). 
Comprehensive approach is based on an assumption that none of the 
activities aiming at creating sustainable peace can succeed in isolation 
– there is a need for concerted and coordinated action of all the actors 
involved, at all levels and during all phases of conflict (Jakobsen, 2008: 
9). NATO’s engagement in comprehensive approach is built in three 
levels: political and strategic, operational and finally tactical. In order 
to achieve success, all three levels must function in a complementary 
manner (AJP 3.4.9, 2013: art. 0109). Comprehensive approach is creat-
ed upon an aspiration to establish a unity of aim, rather than unity of 
effort or command. 
In general, NATO recognises two types of comprehensive approach: 
narrow and broad. Narrow comprehensive approach concentrates on 
enhancing the ability to interact and to promote interaction. Broader 
comprehensive approach aims at equipping and training soldiers, so that 
they are capable of performing tasks related to humanitarian relief, re-
construction and development. As there is no consensus within the Alli-
ance regarding additional tasks and civil capabilities of the military, 
NATO builds closer partnerships with civilian actors experienced and 
skilled in such areas as institution building, development, governance, 
judiciary and police (CIMIC Field Handbook, 2012: p. I-2-6). 




In the introduction of the European Security Strategy (ESS) it is 
stated that most of the conflicts in the 21
st
 century had an intra-state, 
asymmetric character and most of their victims were civilians. The ESS 
therefore recognises the responsibility of the European Union for in-
creasing global security and recognises key threats as terrorism, prolifer-
ation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and state failure 
(European Security Strategy, 2003: pp.3–5). “None of the new threats is 
purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each 
requires a mixture of instruments” (European Security Strategy, 2003: p.
 
7). 
The European Union, as an economic and political organisation with  
a military capability, is therefore able to respond to multi-faceted threats. 
The ESS calls for a more active EU which would be able to respond to 
new threats with a large range of instruments (“including political, diplo-
matic, military and civilian, trade and development activities”; European 
Security Strategy, 2003: p.
 
11) and which would be able to conduct opera-
tions involving both military and civilian capabilities. Also, the ESS 
acknowledges that in order to ensure military efficiency, it is necessary to 
properly manage civilian sphere of the operation during and after the cri-
sis. Finally, the ESS underlines the need for a greater coherence, both 
within different instruments and capabilities of the EU, and with regards 
to the external activities of individual member states. 
The growing complexity of the operational environment calls for an 
enhanced synergy of efforts of different actors. The emphasis is also 
placed on the multidimensional security, which requires not only mili-
tary means, but also capabilities allowing for reconstruction, stability and 
economic development. In 2000 Javier Solana, the High Representative 
for Common Foreign and Security Policy said “Military capabilities, 
civilian capabilities, diplomacy, and our extensive programme of devel-
opment assistance and humanitarian aid – the European Union is and 
will be in a unique situation to draw on a comprehensive range of in-
struments to support its interests world-wide.” (van Osch, 2012: p.109). 
This view is reflected in the Lisbon Treaty which establishes tools for  
a more comprehensive integrated approach. Based on its provisions Europe-
an External Action Service (EEAS) was created in 2011 with a purpose to 
ensure consistency between different areas of EU’s external actions. 
The European Union as the world’s largest economic organisation 
and one of the biggest donors of Official Development Assistance, is 
equipped with a large array of tools spanning the diplomatic, security, 
defence, financial, trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid 
fields (Joint Communication…, 2013: p. 3). It also possesses multiple 
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diplomatic and economic ties with other states and organisations. There-
fore, it is well suited to conduct operations in a complicated environment, 
engaging closely with other international organisations, as well as major 
international NGOs, civil society, think-tanks, academia and public and 
private actors. As stated in the Joint Communication on the EU’s comprehen-
sive approach: “Effective and proactive EU policy responses to conflict and 
crises should draw on the different strengths, capacities, competencies and 
relationships of EU institutions and Member States, in support of a shared 
vision and common objectives” (Joint Communication…, 2013: p.7). 
Institutional setting 
NATO 
At the strategic level NATO’s CIMIC element is embedded into 
Strategic Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). The J9 Division 
of SHAPE is responsible for promoting awareness on Civil-Military 
Interaction and CIMIC issues. Next, NATO Member States are allowed 
to freely interpret CIMIC doctrine, therefore some of them created their 
own separate units for CIMIC, often combined with other soft capabili-
ties (InfoOps, PsyOps). Other Member States prefer to embed CIMIC 
elements within the military structure or use both organisational configu-
rations (van Weezel, 2011: 15–17). 
There are two international headquarters of NATO CIMIC: CIMIC 
Centre of Excellence (CCOE) and Multinational CIMIC Group 
(MNCG). CCOE was established in Enschede (the Netherlands) in 2001 
as CIMIC Group North Headquarters and funded by Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Poland. Its initial 
function was a multinational unit capable of deploying in international 
operations. In 2005 CIMIC Group North was transformed into CIMIC 
Centre of Excellence and in 2014 it was moved to the Hague (the Neth-
erlands). CCOE is not a part of NATO Command structure. It is respon-
sible for advice, training and education together with conceptual and 
doctrinal development, and contribution to the lessons learned processes. 
CCOE is currently sponsored by Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, 
the Netherlands, Poland and Slovenia (CCOE Webpage). 
Multinational CIMIC Group was created in 2002 in Motta di Liven-
za (Italy) and was initially named CIMIC Group South. The founding 
Member States were: Greece, Hungary, Italy and Portugal. In 2009 the 
name was changed to MNCG. It is the only Operational CIMIC Head-
quarters within NATO and can be deployed in support of armed forces 
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conducting an operation. It also provides expertise and consultancy in 
the issues related to civil-military cooperation. Currently the participat-
ing Member States are: Greece, Hungary, Italy, Portugal and Romania 
(MNCG Webpage). 
When it comes to operational and tactical level, CIMIC structure can 
widely vary as it is dependent on the nature and mandate of the opera-
tion, its phase and command. In general, CIMIC personnel should be 
present at all levels of command and force structure. At the tactical level 
it is possible to distinguish some standard arrangements such as: CIMIC 
Deployable Unit, Command Post Team, CIMIC Reconnaissance/ As-
sessment Team, CIMIC Liaison Team, Project Management Team. 
Whenever there is a need for a special expertise, it is possible to employ 
Functional Specialists. They can be either military or civilian and they 
are employed only for the duration of their tasks. They might be special-
ists within the following areas: civil administration, civil infrastructure, 
humanitarian affairs, economy and employment, and cultural affairs and 
education (CIMIC Field Handbook, 2012: p. I-5-9). 
EU 
EU’s CIMIC concept implied that the EUMS is responsible for de-
velopment and execution of CIMIC tasks at the political and strategic 
level. The Military Staff is also tasked with organisation of EU CIMIC 
Conference – a pro-active forum on CIMIC-related issues. Next level of 
the EU’s CIMIC structure are the institutions activated especially for 
EU-led operations: within the Operation Headquarters, Force Headquar-
ters, under the Component Commander and in subordinate formations 
and units. Yet another level of the institutional setting are CIMIC centres 
located in the area of operation. 
As was already mentioned, the first attempt to create a CMCO structure 
responsible for planning and conduct of ESDP/CSDP missions was taken in 
the Document on EU-NATO consultation. At the end of 2003 a Civ-Mil Cell 
was established within the EU Military Staff, tasked with CMCO functions: 
assistance in early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning 
(Rehrl, 2012: pp. 66–67). The two main assumptions behind the creation of 
a civil-military cell were that it was to be distinct from national and multina-
tional capabilities and that it should be developed from practical experiences 
(especially from the operation in the Balkans; Quille, 2006: 14).  
The Cell was led by a military director and a civilian deputy. It was 
responsible to the EU Military Staff, unless the Council activated an 
Operation Centre (OpCen) for a particular operation. In the latter case, 
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the entire personnel of the Civ-Mil Cell was transferred to the OpCen 
and was responsible to the Operations Commander. The Operation Cen-
tre became operational in 2007. Its objective was to provide an addition-
al command option. 
In 2009 the European Council called for the establishment of a new, 
single civilian-military strategic planning structure for CSDP operations 
and missions. Therefore, the Civ-Mil Cell was merged with the relevant 
civilian and defence directorates in the Council Secretariat to create a Crisis 
Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD). Two of the core activi-
ties of CMPD are: strategic planning of CSDP missions and operations 
and coordination of the developments of civilian and military capabilities 
(EU External Action Webpage). 
Challenges 
The challenges and drawbacks concerning civil-military cooperation 
can be divided into two groups: problems specifically regarding each 
organisation and problems common for all of them.  
Common challenges derive form the essence of the relationship be-
tween soldiers and civilians. First, the force and civilian humanitarian actors 
operate on different principles. The military are focused on achieving the 
objective of the mission and providing security, including by the use of vio-
lence. This often contains actions supporting political goals, clearly directed 
against one side of the conflict. On the other hand there are humanitarian 
NGOs, which actions are based on the principles of humanity, neutrality and 
impartiality. It is hard to argue that armed forces can achieve their tasks 
while referring to similar values, but also in many cases it would be impos-
sible for NGOs to conduct their activities without being perceived as neutral.  
One of the strongest fears regarding the involvement in CIMIC derives 
from the perceived risk of humanitarian actors that they will lose their im-
partiality and neutrality while cooperating with the armed forces. Coordina-
tion with the military can be viewed as a threat for the security of humanitar-
ian personnel and provoke attacks on NGOs. An example of the attacks on 
humanitarian personnel by militants are the events of May 2013, when 
armed extremists assaulted the office of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) in Jalalabad (Afghanistan), killing one and injuring three 
(ICRC Webpage). Involvement in CIMIC can also result in the loss of cred-
ibility and access to some areas or civilian (official or unofficial) authorities. 
Next, the military and civilians have different organisational struc-
tures. However trivial this statement might seem, it is crucial for the 
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ability to cooperate and coordinate their actions. The humanitarian actors 
often complain on the prolonged and complicated procedures of the mili-
tary, their rigid command structure and general inflexibility. For the 
armed forces it is difficult to adjust to loosely defined structure of NGOs 
and their lax approach towards priorities and procedures. Organisational 
structures also impact the attitude towards the objectives of both entities. 
While the military is mainly focused on quick impact projects which 
support the military commander and allow for a faster withdrawal from 
the area of the operation, the humanitarian actors are generally more 
concerned with long term perspective. 
In some cases CIMIC military personnel assumes the responsibility 
of local authorities. Although, according to doctrines of NATO and EU, 
this takes place only when local authorities are not able or not willing to 
perform their tasks, it is perceived as a potential threat for the host nation 
and humanitarian environment. Such actions might lead to growing de-
pendence of the host nation on the military mission. This however is 
contrary to the long term objectives of both military and civilian, as their 
primary goal is to create sustainable peace in the operational area. 
As was already mentioned, NATO does not impose the approach 
towards civil-military cooperation on its Member States, therefore they 
present a whole range of attitudes towards this concept. As a result some 
of them treat this notion rather cautiously or even reluctantly, while oth-
ers emphasise its importance and put a lot of effort to improve its provi-
sions. Such differences do not increase the coherence of actions and even 
could be harmful when contingents form various Member States are 
deployed in one operation. 
When it comes to NATO and partially EU approach towards CIMIC, 
there appears a concern that the strategy of ‘winning hearts and minds’ 
through CIMIC activities is not really aimed at achieving goals of sus-
tainable stability and reconstruction, but it only leads to completing the 
military mission and political objectives. The definition of CIMIC as  
a cooperation in support of the military mission and military commander 
might be read as an attempt to exploit all available civilian means to 
achieve military aims.  
The definition of NATO- and EU-CIMIC is based on the principle of 
the mission primacy. In case of NATO such approach is fully justified by its 
strictly military organisational profile. However, when it comes to the Euro-
pean Union, such a definition can raise doubts about the true nature of civil-
military coordination in EU-led operations. EU’s focus on economic and 
political affairs suggests, that its approach towards CIMIC would be more 
balanced and present a softer attitude towards the civil-military relation. 
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EU’s second concept – CMCO is more consistent with the organisa-
tional profile, as it assumes intra-organisational culture of cooperation. 
Yet, for the same reason it also raises some doubts. A complex organisa-
tion like EU should in general be able to ensure successful coordination 
among its various structures. Is there a duly justified need for a separate 
concept which regards a culture of cooperation specific for only one type 
of action? Moreover, EU-CMCO was supposed to be a prerequisite for 
coordination with external actors. As far as the definition goes, this is the 
task for EU-CIMIC. Under those doubts, the concept of CMCO seems to 
be to a certain degree superfluous.  
Summary 
Due to the growth of the complexity of modern operational envi-
ronment, both NATO and the EU adopted a doctrine of comprehensive 
approach. According to its provisions, no entity is able to provide peace, 
security and stability on its own. Modern crisis management requires  
a concerted and coordinated action of many actors specializing in differ-
ent tasks. This means that the Alliance and the European Union recog-
nize the necessity to cooperate with other organisations, including those 
with civilian and military profile. In order to assist in reaching this goal, 
NATO and the EU stress the importance of mainstreaming civil-military 
cooperation into their core documents and policies. 
The Alliance‘s understanding of CIMIC is that of a military capabil-
ity which supports the commander by facilitating cooperation with civil-
ians. It does not imply taking charge over civilian authorities and organi-
sations, but rather creating conditions for viable working relations, 
communication and mutual support. The definition of NATO CIMIC is 
focused on the military perspective, which is understandable given the 
organizational profile and purpose of the Alliance. 
On the other hand, the European Union promotes a dual approach 
towards civil-military cooperation. The first concept is identical with the 
Alliance’s understanding of CIMIC. The second one– Civil-Military 
Coordination – refers to intra-organisational coordination of different EU 
bodies engaged in the process of planning and conducting an operation. 
The purpose of CMCO is therefore to provide a greater coherence within 
the European Union’s CSDP architecture. 
The beginnings of institutionalised civil-military cooperation were 
similar for NATO and the EU. The trigger for both were the experiences 
of the Balkan war and the necessity to adapt to new circumstances of 
conducting military operations. The Alliance was the pioneer in declar-
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ing the need of new capabilities which would allow to establish closer work-
ing relations with the growing number of civilians in the area of operation. 
The European Union closely followed, underlining its ability to encompass 
both civilian and military instruments. Consequently, both organisations 
signed an agreement establishing grounds for joint civil-military operations. 
Civil-military cooperation as a military facilitator and a certain type 
of culture of cooperation had to be mainstreamed into structures of 
NATO and EU. On the strategic level, both organisations created special 
cells and arrangements serving the implementation of CIMIC. As to the 
operational and tactical level, it is impossible to predetermine the shape 
of civil-military coordination structures, as they have to be individually 
tailored to each mission. 
As a final point, it is necessary to state that the biggest issues con-
cerning the implementation of civil-military cooperation and coordina-
tion in the field come from lack of will and lack of information sharing. 
CIMIC is therefore very much dependant on the personal skills of indi-
vidual operators. Careful choice of personnel and their scrupulous train-
ing could enhance the effectiveness and ability to perform successful 
civil-military cooperation, even if it is not the answer to all concerns. 
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PODEJŚCIE NATO I UE DO RELACJI CYWILNO-WOJSKOWYCH  
W OPERACJACH POKOJOWYCH 
Streszczenie  
Stosunki między cywilami i żołnierzami są nieuniknioną konsekwencją istnienia 
wojny, jednak dopiero niedawno zaczęły być regulowane przez jedne z największych 
organizacji międzynarodowych zajmujących się utrzymaniem pokoju. Pierwszym celem 
niniejszego artykułu jest przedstawienie i porównanie najważniejszych regulacji NATO 
i UE, dotyczących relacji cywilno-wojskowych. Autorka prezentuje ewolucję koncepcji 
współpracy cywilno-wojskowej NATO i UE, wypracowane przez nie definicje oraz 
organy odpowiedzialne za implementację koncepcji, umieszczone w kontekście ogólnych 
strategii obu organizacji. Takie zestawienie najważniejszych regulacji pozwoli osiągnąć 
drugi cel artykułu, jakim jest zidentyfikowanie największych wyzwań związanych ze 
współpracą cywilno-wojskową, wspólnych dla NATO i UE oraz typowych dla poszcze-
gólnych organizacji.  
Słowa kluczowe: CIMIC, NATO, UE, relacje cywilno-wojskowe, podejście kom-
pleksowe. 
 
 
